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et al.: People v. Jones

Recent Developments

PEOPLE V. JONES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sixth Amendment-vicinage-criminal
defendant entitled to a jury drawn from a jury panel which includes jurors residing in the geographic area wherein the alleged
crime occurred. 9 Cal.3rd 546, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705
(1973).
In People v. Jones the Supreme Court of California held that
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of "an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"'
is not satisfied when the jury is drawn from a panel which excludes jurors residing in the geographic area where the alleged
crime occurred. 2
Defendant Leon Dwight Jones was found guilty by a jury of
three counts of selling marijuana, 3 and sentenced to a term in
state prison. Jones was a resident of the 77th Street Los Angeles
Police Department Precinct (77th Street Precinct), wherein all of
the alleged crimes had occurred. In 1969, the 77th Street Precinct
was removed from the Southwest Superior Court District (Southwest District) of Los Angeles County, and included within the
Central Superior Court District (Central District).' On May 26,
1970, the Los Angeles Superior Court ordered that all crimes
committed in the 77th Street Precinct be tried in the Southwest
District because there were insufficient numbers of judges and
courtrooms in the Central District to handle the volume of work
until the new Criminal Courts Building was completed. 5 All the
jurors serving in the Southwest District were drawn from a jury
panel which excluded residents of the 77th Street Precinct.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law....
Defendant Jones contended that, as the Sixth Amendment guar1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 9 Cal. 3rd 546 at -, 510 P.2d 705 at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 at 351 (1973).
3. CA,.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11531 (West 1964).
4. Pursuant to Los Angeles County Ordinance No. 9743, effective March 21, 1969,
cited in People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3rd 546, -, 510 P.2d 705, 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347
(1973).
5. Id.; 9 Cal. 3rd at -, 510 P.2d at 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
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antee of a trial by jury applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,' and since an essential feature of such a jury
is that it be drawn from the district wherein the crime was committed 7 his constitutional right to such a jury was violated when
all residents of the Central District were systematically excluded
from the jury which tried him. On these grounds, the defendant
moved to transfer the trial to the Central District. This motion
was denied.8 His motion challenging the jury panel on the same
grounds was also denied
Jones was then tried and convicted. He appealed, based on
his unsuccessful challenge of the jury. The California Court of
Appeals agreed with the People that the word "district" connotes
"county" so that a jury drawn from anywhere within Los Angeles
County satisfied the constitutional requirement that jurors be
drawn from the district in which the alleged crime was committed, and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed
in a 4-3 decision.
The majority relied on Williams v. Florida"for the proposition that the common law right to be tried by a "jury of the
vicinage" is an essential feature of a jury trial as preserved by the
Sixth Amendment. At common law, "vicinage" meant "neighborhood", and a jury of the vicinage meant a jury of the neighborhood or county. - The Sixth Amendment, however, left to Congress the power to determine the actual size of the vicinage.,3
Another essential feature of the jury trial, announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Peters v. Kiff,"4 is the offer of a
fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross section of the
5
community. 1
6. 9 Cal. 3rd at -,
510 P.2d at 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (1973); see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968):
ITihe Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would come within
the Sixth Amendment.
7. 9 Cal. 3rd 546, -,
510 P.2d. 705, 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1973).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. People v. Jones, 26 Cal. App. 3rd 98, -, 103 Cal. Rptr. 475, 479 (1972).
11. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
12. Id. at 93, n.35.
13. Id. at 96.
14. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
15. Id. at 500, cited in People v. Jones, 9 Cal.3rd. 546, -, 510 P.2d 705, 708, 108
Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/14

2

et al.: People v. Jones

Recent Developments
On the basis of the Peters and Williams decisions, the California Supreme Court held that:"6
[A] criminal defendant in a state criminal prosecution has a
constitutional right to be tried by a jury drawn from, and comprising a representative cross section of, the residents of the
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
The point of contention which divided the court in People v.
Jones was the necessity of including, in the jury, residents of
the district wherein the crime occurred. The majority based its
resolution of this issue on two cases, Alvarado v. State,1 7 and
State v. Brown.1 8 From these two cases, they distilled the following principle: 9
Although a jury drawn either from an entire county wherein the
crime was committed or from that portion of a county wherein
the crime was committed will satisfy the constitutional requirement of "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed" . . . a jury drawn from only
a portion of a county, exclusive of the place of the commission
of the crime, will not satisfy the requirement.
In Alvarado v. State, the defendant was tried and convicted in
Anchorage, Alaska, for a crime committed in the native village
of Chignick. The jury panel was drawn from an area within fifteen
miles of Anchorage, thus excluding all jurors from Chignick. The
Alaska Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 20 The court reasoned that the jury must represent the community in which the
crime was committed, and when jurors are selected from an area
which does not encompass the scene of the alleged crime, there
is the danger that significant elements of the community where
the crime was committed will be excluded from representation. 2'
The majority in Jones did not indicate why the Alvarado court
felt that exclusion of the residents of the area where the alleged
crime was committed would lead to the selection of a jury unrepresentative of the community.
16. People v. Jones, 9 Cal.3rd. 546, -, 510 P.2d 705, 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349
(1973).
17. 486 P.2d. 891 (Alaska 1971).
18. 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
19. People v. Jones, 9 Cal.3rd. 546, -, 510 P.2d. 705, 710-11, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345,
350-51 (1973).
20. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 710, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
21. Id. at -, 510 P.2d at 710, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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The dissent in Jones took strong exception to the majority's
reliance on Alvarado. They felt the two cases were distinguishable
on their facts. The defendant in Alvarado was an Indian from the
town of Chignick where the crime occurred. There were significant cultural differences between the native Indians of Chignick
and the more cosmopolitan residents of Anchorage.22 The Jones
majority felt that the great cultural differences were merely illustrative of one of the purposes of the constitutional vicinage rule,
but did not represent an indispensable factor in its application. 3
The dissent disagreed, for it felt that the circumstances presented
in Alvarado were unlike any other conceivable situation in the
24
United States.
Furthermore, while the sections of Alvarado relied on by the
majority appear to support the proposition that selection of jurors
must always include the area surrounding the scene of the crime,
the Jones dissent felt that the majority had failed to consider
footnote 29 of the Alvarado decision. The Supreme Court of
Alaska there noted that a reasonable cross section of the community could conceivably be obtained without drawing prospective jurors from the place where the crime was committed. The
Alaska court went on to note that several decisions imply that
such a selection procedure is acceptable if there is no showing
that the population of the excluded area differs significantly from
the population of the entire area.2
2
In State v. Brown,'
the other case relied on by the majority
in Jones, the alleged offenses were said to have taken place in
Dorchester County, but on the motion of the State, the trial was
removed to Harford County. Defendant Brown sought to remove
the case to the federal courts, claiming, inter alia, he would otherwise be denied a jury fairly representing the community in which
the alleged crime took place. The motion was denied because
Brown had failed to meet the standard for removal; inability to
enforce in the state court a law providing for equal civil rights
stated in terms of racial equality.27 The court distinguished venue
22. Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971). The court in Alvarado said that
differences between a native village and Anchorage include economy, domestic relations,
politics, language, religion, race, cultural heritage and geography. Id. at 899.
23. People v. Jones, 9 Cal.3rd 546, _,
510 P.2d 705, 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351
(1973).
24. Id. at
, 510 P.2d at 718, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (dissent).
25. Id.
26. 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
27. Id. at 77.
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(the place where the trial is held) from vicinage (the area from
which the jury is selected) and stated that the change of venue
violated none of the defendant's rights. It declared, however, that
if the jury were drawn from a panel which excluded jurors from
Dorchester County, Brown's right to a jury drawn from the district where the crime was committed would be violated if it were
possible to get a fair and impartial jury by including the residents
of that county.2
The dissent in Jones felt that the majority gave too much
weight to State v. Brown. The issue in Brown, they noted, was
whether the defendant was entitled to remove his case to federal
court, and the portion of the decision relied on by the majority
was largely dictum and unnecessary for the proper resolution of
2
the controversy.
The court in People v. Jones was careful to note that their
holding was not based on the seemingly significant difference
between the Central and Southwest Districts' black populations.
While there is clearly a serious difference between the thirty-one
percent Negro population of the Central District and the seven
percent Negro population of the Southwest District, the court
said, the defendant would be entitled to a jury drawn from a
panel which included residents of the judicial district where the
crime was committed, even if the two districts had identical proportions of Negroes." While it is for the Legislature to define the
outer limits of the "district", the Sixth Amendment mandates
that the district include the area wherein the crime was committed.'
Justice Burke, writing for the dissent in Jones, viewed the
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement as marking only the extreme bounds of the area from which a jury could be drawn. He
thus concluded that jurors drawn from anywhere in Los Angeles
County would satisfy the constitutional requirement. In support
32
of this analysis, Justice Burke cited United States v. Florence
33
and State v. Kappos.
In Florence, the Court of Appeals, without reference to the
28. Id. at 83.
29. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, _ 510 P. 2d 705, 717, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 357
(1973) (dissent).
30. Id. at -,
510 P.2d at 711-12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
31. Id.
32. 456 F. 2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972).
33. 189 N.W. 2d 563 (Iowa 1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 982 (1972).
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Sixth Amendment, concluded that there was no constitutional
right to a district-wide jury or a jury from any particular division
therein. 4 They based their decision on the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, 35 which requires the selection of jurors to be
made from the counties or political subdivisions surrounding the
place of trial.
In State v. Kappos, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the
constitutionality of a local jury selection statute which permitted
all jurors to be drawn from the City of Ames to the exclusion of
the rest of Store County, despite the fact that cases arising all
over the county were tried in Ames. The court focused on the
impartiality of the jury rather than the vicinage. By inference, to
be impartial, the jury panel need not include residents of the
portion of the district wherein the crime was committed."
The dissent strongly criticized the majority for its easy substitution of the word "district" for the word "community" :3
[J]ust as the term "district" under the Sixth Amendment has
no relation whatever to a particular administrative "district" in
Los Angeles County, likewise the term "community", as used in
cases discussing the issue of impartiality, is neither the geographical equivalent of, nor the lexical synonym of, a local intercounty district such as the Central District of Los Angeles.
The majority, the dissent said, inferentially held that the exclusion of the 77th Street Precinct residents denied the defendant a
jury which reflected a representative cross section of his community. Justice Burke, however, relying on United States v.
Butera8 and People v. McDowell, 3 submitted that a jury unreflective of the community is one which excludes either a "significant element" or a "discernible class" and that a mere geographic
exclusion alone did not suffice to deprive a defendant of his Sixth
Amendment rights.
In Butera, the court said that, while it was aware that attitudes might differ along lines of sex, age, and perhaps education,
34. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, __,
510 P.2d 705, 715, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 355
(1973) (dissent).
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
36. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, -,
510 P. 2d 705, 715-16, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345,
355-56 (1973) (dissent).
37. Id.
38. 420 F. 2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
39. 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
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it was not aware that attitudes differed along county lines." The
court in McDowell reached much the same conclusion, conceding
only that the geographical limitation might have some significance if it divided the county into rural and urban districts.',
Justice Burke noted that defendant Jones made no affirmative
showing of any significant feature sufficient to differentiate the
77th Street Precinct from any other area within Los Angeles
County.
The majority in People v. Jones rejected arguments that the
procedure was justified by the inconvenience and cost to the court
system and prospective jurors which would otherwise result from
the transportation of 77th Street Precinct residents to court in the
Southwest District. The 77th Street Precinct had previously been
in the Southwest District, the court noted, and it was inconceivable to the court that mere redistricting could make the same
42
journey highly inconvenient and costly.
The issue in People v. Jones, however, is not whether the
removal of cases arising in the 77th Street Precinct to the Southwest District will cause inconvenience and undue cost. The question which must really be answered is whether the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement precludes the Los Angeles Superior
Court from removing those cases without also placing the residents of the 77th Street Precinct on the Southwest District's jury
poll.
The United States Supreme Court, in Williams v. Florida,
suggested that the method for determining those features of the
Sixth Amendment which were indispensable components of a
jury was to examine the function that this feature performs and
its relation to the purposes of the jury trial." Neither the majority
nor the dissent in Jones analyzed the history of the vicinage requirement so as to determine its function in relation to the purpose of the jury trial. Such an analysis is a necessary starting
point for ascertaining the validity of the majority holding in
Jones.
Prior to the middle of the fifteenth century, it was essential
that jurors be from the neighborhood where the crime was committed, for they were expected to reach a verdict based on their
40. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, -,
510 P. 2d 705, 716, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 356
(1973) (dissent).
41. Id. at -,
510 P. 2d. at 717, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (dissent).
42. Id. at -,
510 P. 2d. at 712 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
43. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970).
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own personal knowledge of the crime and the defendant.4 4 By the
eighteenth century Blackstone noted that this early method of
trial had already led naturally to an unavoidable problem; jurors
from the immediate neighborhood
would be apt to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the
trial of right. And this our law was so sensible of that it for a
long time has been gradually relinquishing this practice. . . the
jury being now only to come de corporo comitatus, from the
body of the county at large, and not de vicineto, or from the
particular neighbourhood. 5
Clearly, there is some conflict between the vicinage requirement,
and the goal of an impartial jury.
The first settlers to come from England to Jamestown and
Plymouth Rock left an arbitrary and harsh court system." Nevertheless, the belief generally held in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that trial by jury was among the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Magna Charta.47 While historical research has revealed that trial by jury was probably not among the
fundamental rights granted by the Great Charter, it is significant
nevertheless that the colonists associated the right with that great
source of liberty.4" To the colonists, as well as to the citizens of
England, the jury trial served a most important function: It provided a ". . . strong and twofold barrier. . .between the liberties
of the people and the perogative of the crown."4
In 1769 the House of Commons approved a resolution, already passed by the House of Lords, which would require that
persons accused of treason in Massachusetts be tried in England.-" The Virginia legislature, in May, 1769, promptly passed a
number of resolutions, later known as the Virginia Resolves, condemning the Parliamentary resolution. Trying colonists across
the sea, they declared, would violate their rights as British subjects to be tried by a jury from the vicinage. The hardship would
be great, for the accused would not know the court, have friends
44.
45.
1865).
46.
47.
48.

F. HEILER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1969).
3 W. BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 359 (Sharswood ed.
HFEItI, supra note 44 at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id.

49. 4 W. BI.ACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Sharswood ed.
1865).
50. Blume, The Placeof Trial of Criminal Cases: ConstitutionalVicinage and Venue,
43 MICI. L. RFv. 59, 63-64 (1944).
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to aid him, or witnesses to testify in his behalf.5 ' The Virginia
Resolves were quickly approved by the assemblies of the other

American colonies. 52

53
In 1774, the first Continental Congress declared:

That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of
England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to
the course of that law.
It seems clear that "vicinage", as used by the colonists in their
struggle with England, did not refer to the neighborhood or
county from which jurors should be selected. Rather, they were
referring to the venue of the trial. By insisting on a right to a jury
of the vicinage, the colonists hoped to escape the hardship and
danger of a trial in distant England.-4 That this is so, is strengthened by the fact that, in the Declaration of Independence, the
King was condemned, not for interfering with the jury of the
vicinage, but for transporting the colonists across the sea. 5
Notable too is the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for venue in criminal trials, but made no mention of vicinage. 6 The absence of a specific vicinage provision was one of the
principal objections raised by opponents of the Judiciary Article.
Patrick Henry declared that, without juries from the vicinage
57
being secured, the right to trial by jury was in reality sacrificed.
William Grayson, supporting Henry, obviously remembered the
colonists being transported to England for trial when he said:58
[W]here the governing power possesses an unlimited control
over the venue, no man's life is in safety. . . .The idea which I
51. Id., at 64-65.
52. Id. at 65.
53. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress 1774, as cited in B.
SCuWARTZ. TmE Bira. OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 217 (1971).
54. Blume, supra note 50 at 65-66.
55. Declaration of Independence, 1776, as cited in SCHWARTZ, supra note 53 at 25154.
56. This was enacted under the authority of U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2 cl. 3 which
reads:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
57. Patrick Henry in the Virginia convention, June 20, 1788 cited in HELLER, supra
note 44 at 25.
58. William Grayson, cited in HELLER, supra note 44 at 25-26.
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call the vicinage is that a man shall be tried by his neighbors.
But the idea here is that he may be tried in any part of the state
.... The jury may come from any part of the state. . . .The
conclusion. . .is that they can hang anyone they please, by having a jury to suit their persuasion ...
The proponents of the new Constitution argued that a specific vicinage requirement was impractical, as situations such as
a rebellion in an entire district could arise which would make it
impossible to get a jury.59 Furthermore, it was suggested that
knowledge of the neighborhood was no longer essential for jurors
to perform their functions, for their verdict was to be reached on
the facts presented in court."
Richard Henry Lee, in calling for a Bill of Rights through his
Letters from the Federal Farmer, declared that he was in favor
of jury trial of the vicinage so that witnesses might be called
without undue expense. He noted, however, that he otherwise had
no doubt that men could be impartially tried by those who did
not live very near them. 1 It appears that Lee, when talking of
vicinage was in reality talking about venue.
The Sixth Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, was, of
course, finally passed by Congress and ratified by the states. But
before Congress could agree, the contents of the Sixth Amendment were changed drastically, due in part to the Senate's objection to the strict vicinage provision that appeared in the version
passed by the House. The original Amendment read in pertinent
part: "The trial of all crimes. . .shall be by an impartial jury of
freeholders of its vicinage ....-12 James Madison, in a letter to
Edmund Pendleton, suggested that the Senate had objected to
the narrow vicinage requirement in the House version because the
states had such differing vicinage requirements in their own statutes:63
In many of the States, juries, even in criminal cases, are taken
from the State at large; in others, from Districts of considerable
extent; in very few from the County alone.
Thus the Sixth Amendment, as it was finally passed and rati59. HmEI.oR. supra note 44 at 27.
60. Id.
61. R. LEE, OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF TIE SYSTEM OF GoVEIINNENT (1787), as cited in SCHWARTZ. supra, note 53 at 473.
62. Cited in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 94 (1970).
63. Id. at 95 n.39.
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fled,64 represented a compromise between the localist tendencies
of those who wished to restrict vicinage to the courts and the
Federalists who urged a minimum of restraint on the exercise of
the judicial power of the national government. At the time of its
passage, its terms seemed to assure a broad definition of vicinage,
for in all but two instances the judicial district boundaries coin65
cided with those of the states.
Thus the framers of the Constitution were willing to leave to
the legislature the obligation to define the limits of the districts
from which jurors must be drawn in criminal trials. The primary
concern of the colonists was with the protection offered by venue
requirements. To understand how the states, by comparison, view
the need for vicinage requirements, it is necessary to look at their
constitutions.
First of all, the constitutions of all the states guarantee to the
accused the right of trial by jury in criminal trials. Of the fifty
states, twenty-three make no mention of vicinage at all. Of these,
five guarantee only a speedy and public trial or that the right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate;66 two guarantee judgment of
the accused's peers;67 one jury in open court;68 eleven an impartial
jury;6" and four an impartial jury in (not of) the county where the
crime was committed.7 Fourteen of the twenty-three specifically
71
guarantee an impartial jury.
All twenty-seven states which make provisions for vicinage
of some kind specifically guarantee the accused a right to an
impartial jury.
Only three of the twenty-seven states use the term
"vicinage"; 72 one refers to a jury of the "vicinity"; 73 one the "district"; 74 another the "parish"; 75 ten the "county"; 76 and eleven the
64. See p. 415, supra.
65. HEi.ER. supra note 44 at 93-94. Massachusetts and Virginia were each divided
into two districts.
66. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 513; NEV. CONST. art 1, § 3; N.Y.
C(ONST. art. I, § 2; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
67. MASS. CONST. Part 1, art. 12; N.H. CONST. Part first, art. 15.
68. N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 24.
69. ALAs. CONST. art. I, § 11; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 9; DEL. CONST. art I, § 7; GA.
CONST. art I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art 1, § 10; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 21
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I,§ 10; R.I. CONST.
art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
70. FLA. CONST. art I, § 16; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA.
CONST. art. 3, § 14.
71. Alas., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga. Ind., Iowa, Md., Mich., N.J., Ore., R.I., S.C., Tex.
72. KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; PA. CONST., art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
73. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6.
74. HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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"county or district".7 7
This analysis of the states' constitutions is significant only
in that it reveals what rights the states felt were important
enough to make specific. While barely half of the states even
mentioned some form of vicinage requirement, forty-one guaranteed the accused the right to an impartial trial. This is not to say
that the states which did not specifically guarantee to criminal
defendants the right to a jury of the vicinage in their constitutions
denied them that right, for the courts in these jurisdictions have
held that the defendant is guaranteed the rights which existed at
common law at the time the state constitutions were passed. 78
The point simply is that the right to an impartial jury seems to
have been given more weight by the states than the right to a jury
of the vicinage.
As noted, the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana7 held
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a right of jury trial
in all cases which, were they to be tried in a federal court, would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee. The function of
the jury, it was said, was to prevent oppression by the government. The framers of the Constitution were well aware of the need
for protection against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate opposition, and the threat of judges subject to influence
by higher authority. Community participation was a check on
governmental power. 8' Thus, the Court in later cases has said,82
[Tihe essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence.
75. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
76. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; ARK. CONST. art 1], § 10; ILL. CONST. art I, § 8; Miss.
CONsr. art 3, § 26; Mo. CONST. art I, § 18(a); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONsT. art.
II, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art I, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10.
77. AI.A. CONST. art I, § 6; COLO. CONsT. artI, § 16; KAN. CONsT. Bill of Rights, § 10;
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. Ill, § 16; NEB. CONST. art 1, § 11; N.M.
CONST. art II, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; Wis. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; WYo. CONST. art I, § 10.
78. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 32 P. 2d. 433 (1934).
79. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
80. Id. at 149.
81. Id. at 155-56.
82. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410 (1972).
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To the colonists, fearful that venue requirements alone would
not suffice to protect the criminal defendant, some form of vicinage requirement was necessary. By requiring that jurors come
from the vicinage, a further check was placed on the government.
Absent a vicinage requirement, it was feared that it would be an
easy matter for the government to select a jury which would favor
3
the prosecution.
Implicit in the notion that the jury should not be selected so
as to favor the position of the prosecution is the concept that
jurors should be impartial.84 The problem, of course, is that there
will be times when the requirement that jurors be impartial, will
clash with the right to a jury drawn from the vicinage. 5 While
there are early cases which have held that the vicinage requirement forbids a change of venue, 86 the better reasoned cases hold
that the vicinage requirement must yield when the need for an
impartial jury mandates a change. 7 Otherwise, where a particularly notorious crime has made the selection of an impartial jury
impossible, the criminal defendant would not be able to be tried.
As the purpose of the common law was to secure a fair and impartial jury, the right to a jury of the vicinage can not be absolute s'
Assuming that there is nothing to bar the selection of jurors
from the vicinage, selection should be done in such a way as to
83. See pp. 423-24, supra. William Grayson was fearful that a vicinage rule which
would permit a jury to be drawn from all over the state would lead to the same abuse.
84. E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors. Id.
at 722. See aLso, Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, -,
188 A. 574, 579 (1936); State
v. Patterson, 64 Ariz. 40, 165 P.2d 309, 313 (1946).
85. See p. 422, supra, for Blackstone's description of the problem.
86. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481 (1891).
87. E.g., Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, 99 N.W. 769 (1904); State ex rel. Cosner v.
See, 129 W. Va. 722, 72 S.E.2d 31 (1947); Howell v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 34,46 S.E.2d
37 (1948).
88. See, e.g., Barry v. Truax, 13 N.D. 131, _,
99 N.W. 769, 775-76 (1904); and
Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, -,
188 A. 574 (1936):
While vicinage comprehends or includes the venue . . . [citation omitted] the
two are not necessarily coextensive. The main consideration is to give a speedy
trial before an impartial jury drawn from an area broad enough to secure it.
Therefore vicinage must expand itself to meet that situation and when, for
potent reasons, the locality of the venue cannot produce such a jury, the venue
must be moved within the vicinage to the place where an impartial jury can be
obtained. While we are not compelled, at this time, to define with exactness the
extreme limits of the "vicinage", enough has been said to demonstrate the trial
may be removed to another county or venue, without sacrificing this constitutional guarantee.
Id., 324 Pa. at _;
188 A. at 579.
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provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross section of the community.89 But as the Supreme Court in Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co. said,"
This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain
representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently
such complete representation would be impossible. But it does
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these
groups.
The inclusion of "geographical groups" by the Court in Thiel
was a source of difficulty for the courts in two of the cases cited
by Justice Burke in the Jones dissent: People v. McDowell' and
United States v. Butera.9 2 Those cases concluded that, while attitudes may differ along lines of sex, race, age, education, and
social and economic classes, they were not aware that attitudes
normally differed along lines respecting place of residence within
the county. Absent a showing that those excluded might think or
react differently than those included on matters which might be
submitted to them as jurors, such an exclusion is not constitutionally invalid.
In support of the analysis made by these courts, it should be
noted that the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 does not
include geographic areas among its list of prohibited grounds for
93
exclusion from jury service.
The pressure on the courts from ever increasing workloads
has led Congress to divide existing districts into new ones in order
to create additional forums of original jurisdiction. To further
89. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
90. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); and see, Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972):
It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a
class in order to conclude, as we do, that their exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any
case that may be presented.
Id. at 503-504.
91. 27 Cal. App. 3d 864, 104 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
92. 420 F. 2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
93. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (Supp. 1972):
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district
courts of the United States on account of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or economic status.
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alleviate the pressure, districts have been subdivided into divisions." The decision of the court in People v. Jones hinged on the
relevance of these divisions to the Sixth Amendment. The majority in Jones, based on the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in Ruthenberg v. United States,9 5 conceded that a jury did not
have to be drawn from the entire district, but could be drawn
from only a single division. Referring to the cases they found
which were consistent with that holding, the court noted that
"[ffn all those cases the crime had apparently been committed
within the division from which the jury was drawn.""
This led the court to conclude that the "mandate" of the
Sixth Amendment was that, regardless of the size of the district
from which jurors are drawn, the area wherein the crime was
committed must be included. 7
The United States Supreme Court has not so held. In the
case of Lewis v. United States, 8 the Court found that the petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment were not violated,
despite the fact that the alleged crime had occurred in Tulsa
County, Oklahoma, and the residents of Tulsa were excluded
from the jury poll. Prior to 1925, Oklahoma, still a territory, was
divided into two judicial districts. Tulsa County was in the Eastern District at the time the alleged crime occurred. After 1925, a
third judicial district was formed, the Northern District, and
Tulsa County was transferred to that district. By statute, the
Eastern District kept jurisdiction of the case, because the crime
had occurred before the formation of the Northern District. Defendant moved to have the court include on the jury poll residents
of the counties transferred to the Northern District. While the
Eastern District had the power to grant the motion, they did not.
94. See HEIF.aR, supra note 44 at 96.
95. 245 U.S. 480 (1918):
It is contended that plaintiffs in error were not tried by a jury of the state and
district in which the crime was committed, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, because the jurors were drawn not from the entire district but only from
one division thereof. The proposition disregards the plaint text of the Sixth
Amendment, the contemporary construction placed upon it by the Judiciary Act
of 1789 (c. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 88, § 29), expressly authorizing the drawing of a jury
from a part of the district, and the continuous legislative and judicial practice
from the beginning [cites omitted].
Id. at 482.
96. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d. 546, _
510 P. 2d 705, 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351
(1973).
97. Id.
98. 279 U.S. 63 (1929).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and the method of
jury selection:"
Since the court for the Eastern District was sitting pro hoc vice
as one for the entire district as originally constituted, it had
authority to draw and summon jurors from the entire district
... .It was not necessary that this be done. The Sixth Amendment does not require that the accused be tried by juries drawn
from the entire district.
Federal lower court decisions are consistent with Lewis. too
A contemporary construction of the Sixth Amendment, also
consistent with the notion that jurors need not be selected from
the division where the crime occurred, may be obtained by reference to the venue requirement of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in juxtaposition with the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968. Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
states: 0'
Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the
prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was
committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within the
district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and
the witnesses.
It is essential to compare Rule 18 which was amended in 1966,
with the old Rule 18. Rule 18, prior to being amended, said in
pertinent part: "[I]f the district consists of two or more divisions, the trial shall be had in a division in which the offense was
committed."'" 2 It was clearly the intent of Congress, by modifying
Rule 18 as they did, to give the district courts discretion in the
2.
01
matter of venue within the district. '

Section 1861 of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
states: 103
99. Id. at 72.

100. See, e.g., United States v. Florence, 456 F. 2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972); Franklin v.
United States, 384 F. 2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968); Jarl v.

United States, 19 F. 2d 891 (8th Cir. 1927); Larramore v. United States, 8 F. 2d. 736 (5th
Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 586 (1926).
101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
102. 2 L. ORFIEI.D, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 721 (1966).
102.1. See United States v. Fernandez, 480 F. 2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973) (dicta). While

the requirements of the sixth amendment and the first sentence of Rule 18 are satisfied,
the second sentence of Rule 18 is violated where trial was held in a particular place within
the district in which none of the principal witnesses lived and which was not easily
accessible by public transportation. However, a showing of prejudice is required if reversal
is sought on this ground.
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (Supp. 1972).
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It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes

...

. (emphasis added)

Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the
district courts to fix the place of venue in any division within the
district, and section 1861 of the Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968 limits the community from which jurors are to be selected
to the division wherein the court convenes. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that the Sixth Amendment, as construed by
Congress, does not require that jurors be selected from the geographic area where the crime occurred.
CONCLUSION

Neither history, case law, nor statute supports the construction of the Sixth Amendment made by the court in People v.
Jones. Indeed, in light of what has already been said, it is difficult
to understand what would be served by a strict, limiting interpretation of the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement.
At one time, the vicinage requirement was an essential element of the jury trial because jurors were assumed to have had
knowledge of the law and facts before the trial began. But vicinage has long since ceased to have this function, for the nature of
our judicial system requires jurors to be impartial, and to make
their decisions only on the basis of evidence presented in court.
Another function of the vicinage rule was to guard against
government attempts at jury packing. But today, such statutes
as the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 help to assure the
defendant that the list of possible jurors will have been impartially drawn and will not exclude any identifiable groups. Even
further protection is offered by the right of peremptory challenge
during the jury selection process. The vicinage requirement is no
longer needed to protect the defendant from abuses in jury selection.
Today, limiting the area from which jurors may be selected
is little more than a convenience for the residents of a community
who are chosen to serve. Earlier in United States history, when
modes of transportation were limited, the requirements that jurors be drawn from the immediate neighborhood was a pragmatic
necessity. Now, while it might be inconvenient for a resident of
one county to serve on a jury in another, it rarely amounts to a
hardship.
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